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ABSTRACT
The following study will examine the efficacy of 
sanctions as an implement of a state*s foreign policy. In 
terms of U.S.-South African relations, and the former's 
sanctions policy against the latter, the denouement of the 
debate over sanctions' efficacy as a foreign policy instrument 
has yet to occur.
The following study will, first, review the literature 
on sanctions. Because coercion by the threat or actualization 
of economic damage is a fundamental premise of sanctions 
theory, this study will focus principally upon an economic 
sanctions policy's intermediate objective of inflicting 
substantial economic damage upon a target state. According 
to sanctions theory, the greater the harm done to a target 
state's economy by economic sanctions, the greater the 
likelihood that such a policy will be successful in coercing 
the target state to acquiesce to the demands of the sender 
state.
The study will conclude with an analysis of current U.S. 
and multilateral economic sanctions against South Africa. The 
types of sanctions implemented, their enforcement, and the 
current state of the South African economy in light of the 
impact of sanctions will all be taken into consideration. 
This study will reveal not only general knowledge regarding 
current sanctions theory, but also particular knowledge 
concerning the relative efficacy of U.S. economic sanctions 
against South Africa.
Although U.S. and multilateral sanctions have had limited 
success in damaging its economy, the South African government 
has recently begun implementing domestic reforms suggesting 
its intent to eventually terminate the apartheid system. This 
would seem to indicate that current sanctions theory is 
incomplete? although sanctions have had limited success in 
causing substantial damage to its economy, South Africa has 
begun to acquiesce to the demands of the international 
community, a decision arguably arrived at because of 
sanctions.
RETHINKING SANCTIONS THEORY 
U.S. and Multilateral Sanctions Against South Africa
The Theory of Sanctions
Since the end of World War I and the founding of the 
League of Nations, there has been much debate over the utility 
of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. The question itself 
seems simple enough- is the use sanctions an efficient policy 
in the overall strategy of a state's foreign policy? The 
debate over sanctions has grown because of the supposed 
special utility of this policy in modern times. Modern 
warfare has become much too destructive and costly; except in 
the most extreme circumstances, the costs of warfare often 
exceed its perceived or real benefits. A policy of sanctions, 
however, allows a state to implement foreign policy decisions 
against another state, or states, in a decisive manner without 
having to pay the heavy costs of warfare. Daoudi and Dajani 
refer to sanctions as "a cost effective way of engaging in 
belligerence.1'1 Implicit in this definition is the notion of 
appearance; sanctions allow a state at least to appear to be 
implementing a decisive foreign policy without necessarily 
paying the extreme costs of actual warfare- belligerence.2 
Regardless of appearance, however, the question of the actual 
efficacy of sanctions policy remains. The answer to this
1M.S. Daoudi and M.S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions (London: 
Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1983), 12.
2Barry Carter, International Economic Sanctions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1.
3seemingly straightforward and simple question, however,
reveals the very complex nature of sanctions. The only answer
which can be given regarding sanctions' efficacy is that there
is no one answer. The nature of sanctions must be studied in
a contextual manner. Additionally, the types of sanctions
implemented, diplomatic or economic, affect the policy's
efficiency. Other factors regarding sanctions' utility, such
as the economic and social nature of the target country, the
calibration of the implemented sanctions to important sectors
of the target state's economy, and enforcement of the
sanctions, must all be taken into account.
Sanctions theory is predicated on the notion of forcing
a target state to acquiesce to the demands of a sender state
by the threat or actualization of economic damage. The
effectiveness of an economic sanctions policy in achieving the
sender's desired goal is therefore contingent upon the damage
inflicted upon the economy of the target state by the
sanctions themselves. Blumenfeld states that:
The economic impact of sanctions hinges on the 
capacity of the imposing country (or countries) to 
inflict economic 'damage' on the target country via 
embargoes, boycotts and other restrictions on the 
target's international economic relationships.3
Although even severe economic damage might not itself
guarantee a change in the target state's policy, the greater
the negative impact of sanctions upon its economy, the greater
3Jesmond Blumenfeld, "The Economics of South African 
Sanctions," Intereconomics, (July/August 1987), 192.
4the likelihood of compelling the target to acquiesce.
The ability of an economic sanctions policy to realize the 
intermediate goal of inflicting such severe damage upon a 
target state's economy will be limited if the sanctions 
themselves are poorly calibrated in terms of the target's 
economy, if such sanctions are poorly enforced by the sender 
state or states, or if the target state's economy is 
sufficiently developed to render it invulnerable to such a 
policy. The case of U.S. and multilateral sanctions against 
South Africa is an exceptional one; the South African 
government has recently engaged in domestic reform in spite 
of the fact that economic sanctions have had limited success 
in harming its economy. This would suggest that current 
sanctions theory is incomplete because its principal focus, 
the economic impact of sanctions on a target state, fails to 
account for the other possible effects of sanctions. There 
may be other factors contributing to the efficacy of sanctions 
other than economic damage, such as the symbolic and/or the 
psychological impact of sanctions upon a target state's 
government and population.
Given the complexity and the multitude of factors 
involved in the study of sanctions' utility, one must first 
endeavor to understand the nature of sanctions, their variety, 
and the circumstances when a policy of sanctions will, or will 
not, be useful. What is needed, therefore, is a schema, a set 
of criteria by which one may come to understand the necessary
5circumstances for economic sanctions to successfully damage 
a target's economy. With such a schema, one may proceed to 
judge the efficacy of sanctions implemented at different times 
by different states for different reasons.
Definition of Terms
A policy of sanctions implies three specific elements: 
a sender, a target, and a goal. With these three elements in 
mind, a definition of sanctions can be developed. Galtung 
Refines sanctions as actions, other than warfare or the use 
of armed forces, initiated by one or more international actors 
against one or more others with either or both of two 
purposes: punishment or coercion.4 Carter's definition of
sanctions adds to the list of purposes the concept that 
sanctions can be implemented to demonstrate the sender 
country's opinion about some negative aspect of the target 
country.5 The state which develops and initiates the 
sanctions policy is referred to as the sender. Although more 
than one state may be involved in implementing sanctions, as 
Hufbauer and Schott point out, it is usually one state which 
initiates the policy.6 The object of the sanctions policy, 
similarly a state or states, is termed the target. The goals
4Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic 
Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," World 
Politics 3 (April 1967): 379.
5Carter, 3.
6Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered:_____ History and Current Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1985) 27.
6
sought by this policy vary; as already mentioned, sanctions 
may be implemented as a means of punishing the target state 
for some aspect of its policy. As argued by Carter, Daoudi 
and Dajani, sanctions policy may also be used to demonstrate 
the sender’s opposition to some policy of the target. It can 
also be used as a means of "forcing the target state to comply 
with certain norms the sender states deem important," that is, 
policy change.7 Greater analysis of sanctions policies' 
rationales, its goals, will be done later, because goals 
necessarily determine the policy's success or failure.
7Daoudi and Dajani, 7.
Types of Sanctions
There are numerous types of sanctions, ranging from 
diplomatic to economic. Galtung divides sanctions into three 
categories: l) diplomatic sanctions, which involve the
partial or total disruption of diplomatic relations between 
states, 2) communication sanctions, in which communications 
between states, such as mail, transportation, and media, are 
disrupted in a partial or total manner, 3) and economic 
sanctions, the rupture of trade relations between states.8 
Sanctions must always be understood to be official in nature, 
never initiated by a private organization, but rather by a 
state 1s government.
This work will deal exclusively with economic sanctions. 
Economic sanctions policy, as defined by Hufbauer and Schott, 
is 'the deliberate, government inspired withdrawal, or threat 
of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations 
between states.' Customary economic relations refer not to 
contractual relations, but to the level of economic relations 
that would occur between target and sender had an economic 
sanctions policy not been implemented.9 Economic sanctions,
8Galtung, 383.
9Hufbauer and Schott, 2.
8
9therefore, refer to the partial or total impedance of trade 
relations between target and sender for an avowed purpose or 
goal. Economic sanctions may include limiting, or totally 
rupturing, imports from the target, exports to the target, and 
financial relations between sender and target. The latter 
category refers to private and public financial affairs: 
loans, credits, etc. Sanctions may be imposed by one state 
(unilateral), by many (multilateral), or by the entire global 
system (universal) against the target. As will be seen, the 
number of actors involved in the implementation of sanctions 
will in some measure influence the policy's chances for 
success.
Already mentioned is the fact that sanctions are 
implemented by the sender against the target for specific 
goals. These goals generally imply a desire on the part of 
the sender for the target state to change some aspect of its 
national policy as a result of the program of punitive 
economic measures known as sanctions. Like Carter, Renwick 
points out that a sanctions policy is also a highly effective 
means by which a sender state may demonstrate its disapproval 
towards a target state.10 Excluded from national policy are 
matters of commercial or financial relations between the 
sender and target states.11
10Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Center
for International Studies, 1981), 85.
11Hufbauer and Schott, 2.
10
Defining the above terms is more than a tautological 
exercise, for it reveals the nature of sanctions, specifically 
economic sanctions. Sanctions are punitive and negative in 
nature. With such a policy, the sender seeks to punish the 
target, via the disruption of economic relations, for some 
aspect of its national policy. In the case of United States' 
sanctions against the Republic of South Africa, the national 
policy in question is that of apartheid. Through a policy of 
economic sanctions, the United States, as well as other sender 
states, seeks to punish South Africa for its policy of racial 
segregation, apartheid. Adding to this punitive aspect of 
economic sanctions is isolation: the target state is isolated
from the international community in the way a criminal is 
isolated from general public by being placed in prison.
The definition of terms also gives rise to other, basic 
questions which will presently be addressed. What are the 
various rationales for imposing sanctions? Is the efficacy 
of economic sanctions policy determined by the particular 
goals sought by the sender? How does one measure the efficacy 
of sanctions, how does one tell if sanctions have contributed 
to the desired outcome sought by the sender state? These 
questions all lead to one central question: what conditions
are necessary for economic sanctions to achieve optimal 
efficiency?
Rationales for Implementing Economic Sanctions
As sanctions are a tool of a state's foreign policy, it 
is assumed they are implemented by a sender with certain goals 
or objectives in mind. Such goals and rationales may be 
separated into two categories: implied goals and explicit
goals. The former refers to objectives not specifically 
outlined by a sender state as a tangible goal. The most 
important implied goal in the use of economic sanctions, as 
agreed upon by Carter, Daoudi and Dajani, and Hufbauer and 
Schott, is demonstration of resolve. That is, the imposition 
of economic sanctions symbolically demonstrates a sender 
state's opposition to some aspect of the target state's 
national, or international policy, to the domestic and 
international community.12 Daoudi and Dajani further explore 
the functions of implied sanctions:
1. Sanctions express a sender states morality and 
judgement regarding the target state.
2. Sanctions signify the sender's disapproval and
displeasure with the target.
3. Sanctions satisfy the emotional needs of the sender.
4. Sanctions maintain the sender's positive image 
and reputation in the world community.
5. Sanctions relieve domestic pressure on the sender
government for dec i s ive„act ion.—  -
12Carter, 12
11
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6. Sanctions inflict symbolic vengeance.13
All sanctions policies have implicit objectives, goals 
not specifically stated by a sender state. These implicit 
goals, such as economic sanctions policy symbolically 
displaying a sender state's disapproval of another state's 
policy, are quite effective and easy to realize. Another 
implied goal is that of symbolic punishment. As stated, 
economic sanctions are punitive in nature, in that they may 
harm the target state's economy; punishment for some aspect 
of that state's national policy. Also implied by this policy 
is the hope, the desire, that the target state, having been 
economically damaged by sanctions, will ultimately change that 
aspect of its national policy, its behavior as it were, which 
was deemed objectionable.
Hufbauer and Schott examine the parallels between the 
implied rationales of economic sanctions and criminal law: to 
punish, to deter, and to rehabilitate.14 Galtung, in his study 
of economic sanctions, addresses this punitive aspect of the 
policy. He argues that "modern penology, (1966), does not 
seem to warrant much belief in punishment as a general method 
of making people comply."15
13Daoudi and Dajani, 161.
14Hufbauer and Schott, 10.
15Galtung, 380.
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The nature of these implied goals is very subjective. 
If punitive economic sanctions are initiated by a state solely 
for domestic and international consumption, their utility may 
be quite real. As pointed out by Daoudi and Dajani, economic 
sanctions express the sender state's disapproval and 
displeasure with the target state to the domestic and 
international communities. However, sanctions as a foreign 
policy tool may have more tangible rationales aimed at 
achieving certain, explicit goals.
A policy of economic sanctions may have explicit 
rationales, that is, actual, tangible goals stated by the 
government of the sender state. In their study, Hufbauer and 
Schott divide such explicit goals into five separate 
categories:
1. Changing a target state's policies in a modest way 
Issues in this category are of limited importance 
to both actors. Included would be limited human 
rights abuses by the target state.
2. Destabilizing the target government, such as the U.S. 
use of sanctions to help bring down the Allende 
regime in Chile in 1973, as well as ongoing U.S. 
sanctions against Nicaragua, aimed at destabilizing 
the Ortega regime.
3. Disruption of a target state's minor military 
activity. An example of this would be sanctions 
implemented by the U.S. against the U.K. and France 
in 1956 after the Suez Canal episode.
4. Impairment of target state's military potential, 
such as the termination of export of certain U.S. 
goods to Japan, goods deemed vital to the later's 
military, prior to WWII.
5. Changing a target state's policies in a major way. 
Under this category would be included U.S. economic 
sanctions against South Africa; a policy initiated
14
with the explicit goal of the termination of 
apartheid.
Hufbauer and Schott point out that a sender state may impose 
sanctions with more than just one of the above goals in mind.16 
Similarly, sanctions may be initiated to achieve one goal, but 
may realize others. In regards to the particular rationale 
of changing a state’s policy, one may see the special utility 
of sanctions. Economic sanctions are more belligerent in 
nature than diplomatic sanctions, for they can, under the 
proper circumstances, adversely affect the target state’s 
economy, whereas diplomatic sanctions cannot. At the same 
time, the policy of economic sanctions is less belligerent in 
nature, as well as less costly, than actual military action.
Within the debate regarding sanction's efficacy is the 
question of how to measure such efficacy. How does one 
measure whether a sanctions policy was effective or not? Did 
it achieve the explicit, expressed goals of the sender state? 
If goals were achieved, to what extent did sanctions policy 
aid in that realization? If a portion of an expressed goal 
was realized, does that imply that the sanctions policy was 
effective?
The Hufbauer and Schott method for measuring sanction’s 
success involves two questions. The first question regards 
the extent to which the stated policy, the ultimate explicit 
goal desired by the sender, was in fact realized. The second
16Hufbauer and Schott, 29.
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question regards the contribution made by the sanctions policy 
to the positive outcome.17 Therefore, the success of a 
sanctions policy may best be empirically judged by comparing 
its relative impact against its explicit objectives set forth 
by the sender state.
17Ibid. , 32.
Conditions Necessary for Effective Sanctions Policy
If an economic sanctions policy is to be effective, if 
it is to realize its explicit goal, it must attain an 
intermediate goal- seriously threatening the target state's 
economy. Sanctions theory rests on the premise that a target 
state can be coerced to change some aspect of its foreign or 
domestic policy if it is subject to economic sanctions which 
cause serious harm to its economy. Therefore, the failure of 
an economic sanctions policy to realize the intermediate 
objective of causing sufficient economic damage will 
necessarily limit the probability that the target state will 
be coerced into a desired action.
The failure of economic sanctions to achieve their 
intermediate goal may be the result of such a policy being 
improperly or haphazardly implemented, or implemented under 
conditions which would prohibit its effectiveness. Economic 
sanctions imposed by a sender state or group of states, to be 
effective, must be well enforced and relevant to important 
aspects of the target state's economy. Of course, in order 
to ensure enforcement, a sender state must take special care 
to ensure that the various measures spelled out in the policy, 
whether import, export or financial sanctions, are monitored 
and consistently enforced. This might require the expansion
16
17
of an existing administrative body or the creation of a new 
one; both processes may prove quite costly for the sender 
state. For obvious reasons, sanctions poorly enforced will be 
limited in their effectiveness. Similarly, to achieve maximum 
effectiveness, sanctions must be imposed so as to harm key 
sectors of the target state's economy. In order to
"calibrate" sanctions to this end, the sender state must be 
knowledgeable about the target state's economy; it must know 
its most vulnerable areas.
As stated in the initial portion of this study, sanctions 
policy can only be as efficient as the circumstances, the 
context as it were, in which they are imposed allow. Certain 
conditions must exist in both the sender and target country 
for an economic sanctions policy to achieve the necessary, 
intermediate objective of seriously damaging the target 
state's economy, which in turn will increase the likelihood 
that the policy's ultimate, explicit objective may be 
realized.
Daoudi and Dajani list several conditions which must be 
taken into account by a state proposing to initiate economic 
sanctions. Among these considerations are:
1. Are there other sources (states) which are willing 
to supply the goods which the sender state is now 
denying the target?
2. Are there substitutes or alternative which the 
target state could use to make up for the loss of 
supply from the sender?
3. Is the target trade dependent with the sender?
18
4. What are the key components of the target's economy? 
That is, what portions of the target's economy are 
most vulnerable by being dependent upon the 
exporting and importing of goods?
5. Are the target's reserves of gold and foreign 
exchange limited? Can they be limited through 
financial sanctions?
6. Have sanctions been given adequate time to take 
hold?
These considerations, it is argued, will influence in a great 
way the relative success of economic sanctions policy in 
achieving the sender state's goals.18 The first five criterion 
have in common the element of vulnerability. That is, they 
are concerned with how vulnerable certain aspects of a 
target's economy are to sanctions. Intuitively, it stands to 
reason that if a target's economy is highly dependent upon 
imports from the sender, or exports to the sender, and if its 
gold and foreign exchange reserves are limited, then economic 
sanctions should have a considerable impact upon the target's 
economy, thereby hopefully influencing the that target state's 
government to comply with the stated wishes of the sender 
state's government.
Galtung's set of conditions for sanctions to have optimum 
efficiency is quite similar to the set developed by Daoudi and 
Dajani. His are as follows:
1. Imports assume great importance on sectors of the 
target's economy.
2. There is no internal source of substitution for 
the imports embargoed.
18Daoudi and Dajani, 163-6.
19
3. Imports from the sender state assume critical 
importance in sectors for the target* economy.
4. There is no external substitute for the embargoed 
imports, that the target state may change trading 
partners.
5. The imports embargoed make up a small percentage of 
the sender state's total exports.
6. The target's exports, boycotted by the sender, are 
sent mainly to the sender. There should be no easy 
substitution of trading partners by the target.
The sender should be main buyer of boycotted good.
7. The sender nation can obtain the goods boycotted from 
other sources. The sender nation, under ideal 
circumstances, should not engage in sanctions which 
might injure its own economy.19
Both set of criteria reveal certain crucial concepts 
regarding sanctions. One such concept is vulnerability. A 
target state's economy must have certain vulnerabilities so 
that economic sanctions, when imposed, will have such a 
negative effect upon its economy that it will be in the target 
state's interest to comply with the stated desires of the 
sender state than to endure continued sanctions. As Carter 
points out, a target state which exports a great deal of value 
to one particular country will be vulnerable to an import 
boycott. Similarly, a country dependent upon certain goods 
from a sender state will be more vulnerable to a export 
embargo.20 Accepting this notion of vulnerability, Hufbauer 
and Schott conclude that sanctions will have a greater effect
19Galtung, 383-4.
20Carter, 24-5.
20
if they are imposed by a large, economically developed country 
against a smaller, less developed one. Therefore, the 
vulnerability of a target state's economy is substantially 
determined by its level of development, the diversification 
of its economy, and the number of its trading partners.
Another concept implied in the criteria of Galtung, 
Daoudi and Dajani, involves the proximity of sanctions to the 
target's economy, already discussed as calibration. This 
complements the above idea of vulnerability. Sanctions should 
be developed, custom-made as it were, to suit the particular 
aspects of the target economy. Sanctions must not be 
haphazard. As Galtung states, the desired sanctions policy 
should stress maximum effect with minimum boycott actions, so 
that the sender state does not risk too much economically.21 
Therefore, it is imperative that the proper types of sanctions 
be employed to maximize effect. Within this, two particularly 
effective weapons may be employed. The first involves 
financial sanctions- the sender state's prohibition of private 
and public financial transactions, especially the granting of 
loans and trade credits, to the target state. All states' 
economies require financial inputs; often these can only be 
obtained on the international market. The fewer the sources 
of such financial input, the higher the lending rate of 
interest will tend to be. The second weapon involves energy,
21Galtung, 383.
21
especially oil. The cutting-off of a target state's oil 
supply, its energy supply in essence, can have dramatic 
effects upon the target's economy, thereby making the target 
more amenable to submit to the sender.
One last concept is time, or duration. The longer the 
imposed sanctions are in force, the more likely they will have 
a decisive impact upon the target's economy, hence the greater 
the likelihood for the target's compliance with the sender's 
stated goals. Duration, however, is a consideration based 
upon the former three considerations of the calibration of 
sanctions to the target's economy, enforcement of such 
sanctions, and the vulnerability of the target state's economy 
to sanctions. If sanctions are not rigorously enforced, if 
the sanctions are not calibrated in terms of important sectors 
of the target state's economy, or if the target's economy is 
immune, invulnerable to such sanctions, then duration will not 
be a consideration.
In sum, the success of an economic sanctions policy, 
implemented by a sender state to achieve an explicit goal, is 
contingent upon the ability of such sanctions to cause severe 
damage to the target state's economy. In turn, the ability 
of economic sanctions to realize the intermediate goal of 
damaging a target state's economy is contingent upon:
1. the calibration of the sanctions in terms of 
important sectors of the target state's economy?
2. the enforcement of such sanctions to ensure their 
effectiveness;
the vulnerability of the target state’s economy 
to economic sanctions.
U.S. Sanctions: The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
Having considered the three aforementioned considerations
regarding a sanctions policy’s effectiveness, calibration,
enforcement and vulnerability, an analysis of U.S. sanctions
against the Republic of South Africa is in order. As stated
in section 4 of its preamble, the purpose of the 1986
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act is,
to set forth a comprehensive and complete framework 
to Guide the efforts of the United States in helping 
to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and 
lead to the establishment of a nonracial, democratic 
form of government.22
Therefore, the explicit goal of U.S. sanctions against South
Africa is the termination of apartheid. This falls in the
category of a major policy change in the Hufbauer and Schott
survey which analyzed seventeen cases where sanctions were
initiated with the explicit goal of changing the policy of a
target state in a major way. Current U.S. sanctions against
South Africa were not included, because the program was
initiated in late 1986, after the survey was done. According
to this survey then, sanctions imposed against a target state
with the hope of changing a particular policy of the state in
a major way has limited utility. (Interestingly, the Hufbauer
22Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, U.S. Code, vol. 22, 
secs. 5001 (1986).
23
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and Schott survey reveals that sanctions have achieved 
greatest utility when they are imposed against a target state 
with the explicit goal of destabilizing the target state's 
regime rather than changing its behavior.) Hufbauer and 
Schott's survey reveal that in only three of the seventeen 
cases studied did a sanctions policy help to realize a 
specific policy change by the target state.23
By the various economic pressures spelled out in the Act, 
which will be discussed later, the U.S. government hopes to 
realize the goal of apartheid's termination. As previously 
stated, although there is no guarantee that an economic 
sanctions policy will, or will not, realize its ultimate 
objectives, the likelihood that it will is increased if the 
policy first accomplishes the intermediate objective of 
causing serious harm to the target state's economy. The case 
of U.S. and multilateral sanctions against South Africa is an 
exceptional one; there have recently been promising political 
reforms in South Africa, such as the release of Nelson Mandela 
and the un-banning of the African National Congress (ANC) in 
early 1990, in spite of the fact that sanctions have failed 
in achieving the intermediate goal of causing serious damage
23Hufbauer and Schott, 46-7.
Hufbauer and Schott go on to show that in two of the 
three cases, the target state was involved in a civil war: 
the submission of Hyderabad to India and the defeat of Biafra 
by Nigeria. The one case of partial success regarding major 
policy change was the Arab League oil embargo imposed upon the 
U.S. and Netherlands in 1973.
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to its economy.
The as yet limited effectiveness of U.S. sanctions policy 
to accomplish the intermediate objective of inflicting serious 
damage to the South African economy may be explained by:
1. The calibration of U.S. sanctions imposed against 
the South African economy is defective; U.S. 
sanctions are not harming the most important 
sectors of South Africa's economy.
2. The U.S. economic sanctions are not being 
sufficiently enforced, rendering even the most 
well-calibrated sanctions impotent.
3. Because South Africa has a relatively developed 
and diverse economy with a number of trading 
partners, it may be impermeable to, or at least 
strong enough to resist U.S. sanctions, as well 
as the sanctions of other states.
This study, then, will deal principally with the U.S. 
sanctions' as yet limited success in realizing the 
intermediate objective of inflicting serious economic damage 
to South Africa. Well-calibrated, well-enforced sanctions 
applied against South Africa by the U.S., as well as by other 
developed states which comprise some of South Africa's 
principal trading partners, ought to realize the intermediate 
goal of having a substantially negative impact on South 
Africa's economy. In turn, the realization of this 
intermediate goal ought to increase the likelihood of 
sanctions' ultimate success- the South African government's 
termination of apartheid.
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U.S. economic sanctions, especially those enumerated by 
the CAAA, as well as economic sanctions imposed against South 
Africa by other developed states will first be presented for 
analysis. Having discussed these sanctions, the study will 
move on to a broad study of the current state of the South 
African economy. Lastly, the study will deal with those 
factors which have contributed to sanctions' limited success 
in damaging the South African economy.
Comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions against South 
Africa were first implemented on September 9, 1985 when
President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12532. The order 
imposed a series of measures against South Africa including 
bans on:
1. computer exports to the South African 
military,police, and agencies enforcing 
apartheid;
2. exports of nuclear goods and technology 
to South Africa?
3. imports of krugerrands and other gold coins 
minted in South Africa; and
4. U.S. bank loans to the South African government 
and government business enterprises, otherwise 
known as parastatals.24
These limited economic sanctions had little effect on general 
U.S.-South African trade and investment relations, as the bulk 
of trade between the two states remained in the private
24William H. Cooper, Sanctions Against South Africa: Impact on 
the United States (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
Economics Division, August 24, 1989), 2, IB87198.
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jsector. These sanctions were limited in scope because the
^thrust of the Reagan administration’s policy toward South
1
j Africa at the time was1 "constructive engagement"; friendly 
dialogue between the respective governments of the United 
States and South Africa to encourage domestic reform in the
* latter. Sanctions were expanded when, on October 2, 198 6, 
overriding President Reagan's veto, Congressional Bill HR 4868 
was enacted into Public Law 99-440 by the U.S. Congress; the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA). Far more
comprehensive in scope than the Executive Order, the key 
restrictions of the 1986 CAAA included;
1. codification of sanctions previously imposed by 
President Reagan in 1985: the ban on the
importation of krugerrands and other South 
African gold coins, ban on exports of computer 
hardware and technology to South African 
military, police, and apartheid-enforcing 
organizations, prohibition on loans to the South 
African government and its parastatals, and the 
prohibition on nuclear trade with South Africa;
2. ban on the importation of South African military 
articles;
3. prohibition on the importation of products from 
South African parastatals;
4. ban on U.S. airlines landing in South
Africa and landing rights in U.S. for South
African Airways;
5. prohibition of U.S. banks accepting or
maintaining deposit accounts by any South
African government agncy or entity except those 
used for diplomatic or consular services;
6. ban on imports of uranium ore, uranium oxide, 
coal, textiles, iron, steel, and agricultural 
products manufactured in South Africa;
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7. ban on exports of petroleum products to South 
Africa; and,
8. a ban on private corporate investment and new 
bank loans to South African businesses25
Under the Title V, Sec. 501(a) of the CAAA, the President 
was required to impose further economic sanctions against 
South Africa if that state was judged not to be making 
progress towards domestic reforms, the termination of 
apartheid and nonracial democracy, within one year. Although 
President Reagan's report to Congress in 1987 in regards to 
South African domestic reforms was negative, he declined to 
impose further economic sanctions, citing the questionable 
utility of further sanctions for achieving their explicit 
goals at that time.26
Additional sanctions were proposed in the 100th and 101st 
Congresses respectively. Such proposals included H.R. 1580, 
passed by the House on September 7, 1988, which would have, 
among other measures, banned all U.S. investment in South 
Africa, prohibited all imports from South Africa (except for 
critical strategic materials and products of companies owned 
entirely by non-white South Africans), prohibited most U.S. 
exports to South Africa, and required the President to confer 
with industrialized nations to develop multilateral measures
25Comorehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Title I.
26Cooper, 7.
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to aid in the termination of apartheid. This bill eventually 
died in the U.S. Senate.27 House and Senate bills proposed 
during the 101st Congress, especially H.R. 21 and S. 507, 
sought to close various loopholes in the 1986 CAAA. Included 
in these bills was the elimination of exceptions on the ban 
on nuclear trade with South Africa, a requirement for the 
President to retaliate against foreign companies who were 
taking advantages of U.S. sanctions, and the explicit 
requirement, not just the authorization given by the CAAA, 
that the President pursue agreements with other countries for 
the implementation of multilateral sanctions.28
As already mentioned, the CAAA authorized the President 
to engage in international negotiations with other 
industrialized states, mainly Western Europe, Japan and Asian 
NIC's, in order to reach agreements regarding multilateral 
economic sanctions against South Africa which in turn would 
aid in the goal of the dismantling of apartheid. According 
to Sec. 401(a), Title IV of the Act, "The net economic effect
27Ibid.
28Brenda M. Branaman, South Africa: U.S. Policy After
Sanctions (Washington D.C. : Congressional Research Service, Foreign 
Affairs and National Defense Division, August 14, 1989), 9,
IB87128.
H. 21 was referred to the following House committees for 
consideration: Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, Banking and
Finance, Urban Affairs, Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, Rules, 
Intelligence, and Interior and Insular Affairs.
S. 507 was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
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of such cooperative agreements should be measurably greater
than the net economic effect of the measures imposed by this 
29 •'Act." This particular provision, which recognized the
importance, the virtual necessity, of multilateral action on 
economic sanctions, is quite revealing. Although the CAAA was 
the most comprehensive sanctions legislation imposed to date 
against South Africa by any country, its framers recognized 
that South Africa's vulnerability to such sanctions would be 
further increased by multilateral pressure.30
Given the importance multilateral sanctions in achieving 
the necessary intermediate goal of causing serious harm to the 
South African economy, a brief summary of other state's 
economic sanctions against South Africa is in order.
29Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Title IV, Sec. 401(a).
30This statement requires qualification. Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden all imposed total trade sanctions against South Africa, 
banning by law all imports from and exports to South Africa. Given 
the negligible level of trade between these states and South 
Africa, the impact of such sanctions upon the South African economy 
can be considered marginal. As shall be discussed later, loopholes 
in these sanctions further reduced their impact upon the South 
African economy.
Multilateral and Universal Sanctions
European sanctions against South Africa were much less 
comprehensive than those set out by the CAAA. In 1984, the 
EEC announced a ban on new investment by its members in South 
Africa. Like the U.S. CAAA, the EEC banned further 
cooperation by its member states with South Africa in the 
nuclear field. Also banned were exports of "sensitive 
equipment" such as intelligence gathering and processing 
technology which could be used by South African law 
enforcement and military agencies and all exports to South 
Africa of crude oil circulating in the members' free 
markets.31 In September, 1986, prior to the enactment of the 
CAAA, the EEC imposed a ban on the imports of South African 
iron and steel, two important South African exports which 
accounted for about $356 million annually.
Margaret Thatcher's Great Britain, although never an 
ardent supporter of economic sanctions, went along with 
general EEC sanctions and even imposed some sanctions of its 
own, including a ban on the importation of krugerrands, an
31Charles M. Becker, "The Impact of Sanctions on South Africa 
and its Periphery," The African Studies Review 31 (September 
1988) :
62.
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embargo on trade with South Africa in arms and paramilitary 
hardware, and a call for a voluntary end to new investment in 
South Africa by British firms.32
Japan also enacted economic sanctions against South 
Africa in 1986 and 1987, including a ban on the export of 
computers to South African government agencies which enforce 
apartheid, a ban on imports of iron and steel, and the 
suspension of air links between the two states.
Universal sanctions against South Africa, that is, 
sanctions voted by the United Nations, although the oldest, 
have been the least effective. U.N. sanctions against South 
Africa, beginning in 1963, have generally addressed the 
cessation of arms shipments to South Africa. In 1987, 
however, much broader sanctions, on the scale of the U.S. 
CAAA, were considered in the Security Council and were 
summarily vetoed by the U.S. and Great Britain. Commitment 
and resolve to action are necessary for a sanctions policy to 
achieve its goals? considering the U.S. veto of the above 
proposal for expanded economic sanctions against South Africa, 
one might question the resolve of the U.S. to the termination 
of apartheid by the use of such a policy.
How effective were these economic sanctions? If the 
above sanctions were properly calibrated and enforced to 
maximize impact upon a South African economy presumed to be
32Ibid.
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vulnerable to such measures, and if the sanctions policy 
achieved the intermediate objective of seriously damaging the 
South African economy, then, according to the general theory 
of sanctions, the pressure generated on the South African 
government should have increased the likelihood that it would 
acquiesce to the demands of the international community and 
major policy changes regarding the termination of apartheid 
and the subsequent implementation of a non-racial democracy, 
both of which are the ultimate objectives of the U.S. 
sanctions policy.
Effects of Economic Sanctions Upon South Africa
As former Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica points out, the 
effects of such sanctions must be viewed against the 
background of serious economic problems the South African 
economy had been experiencing prior to the implementation of 
these measures. He notes that between 1981-1985, before major 
U.S. sanctions were implemented, South Africa's real GNP had 
not grown at all, in spite of record gold prices during the 
late 197 0s and early 1980s.33 Although South African real GDP 
grew during this period, from 1982-1986 consumer prices 
steadily rose while manufacturing output fell.34 Attempts by 
the government to lower the inflation rate and improve its 
balance of payments by eliminating deficits led to a recession 
in the economy, an increase in the inflation rate, and 
increased foreign debt.
Seaga notes that this recession was further compounded 
by events in 1985. Following the government's decree of a
33Edward Seaga, "Impact of Economic Sanctions on the South 
African Economy," The Round Table #306 (April 1988):
136.
^International Monetary Fund, Monthly Abstract of Trade 
Statistics. 1989, 476-7.
Decrease in manufacturing production does not include the 
mining industry, in which output steadily grew at this time.
34
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national state of emergency, several U.S. banks called in all 
their short-term loans to South Africa and imposed a freeze 
on new lending. Despite the South African government's 
retaliation of a moratorium on all loan payments, a massive 
capital outflow began compounding the effects of the 
recession.35 By late 1987, the inflation rate was at about 
18% and South Africa's foreign debt amounted to over $22 
billion.36 Seaga additionally notes the economic strain of 
South African expenditures on its military, as well as 
enforcement of the apartheid system. The programs take up 13% 
and 14% of the annual budget, respectively.37
In sum, even before economic sanctions were imposed, 
South Africa1s economy had been experiencing decidedly hard 
times. The greatest harm done to the already weakened South 
African economy by sanctions came from imposition of financial 
sanctions by the United States and other states. The U.S. 
placed prohibitions on any bank loans or new investment in 
South Africa; the U.K., France and West Germany imposed
35Seaga, 13 7.
According to International Financial Statistics: 1985- real
payments abroad were R6.5 billion, R7.8 billion in 1986, and R7.5 
billion in 1987.
36Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, 
Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications For the United 
States: South Africa, prepared by American Embassy, Pretoria, 89- 
50. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, May 1989), 
2.
37Seaga, 13 7.
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prohibitions on all new investment and long-term bank loans.38 
These prohibitions, culminating in a net capital outflow, put 
a severe strain on the South African economy, hindering its 
average rate of growth.39 During the last two quarters of 
1986, the economy's growth was estimated at 3.5%; by 1987, 
however, the South African economy managed only a 2.1% growth 
rate. In 1988, its growth improved somewhat, being estimated 
at 3.2%.40 This growth can be attributed to the impetus given 
the economy by import substitution in South Africa following 
the implementation of various export sanctions against South 
Africa. Although the economy continued to grow in spite of 
sanctions, its growth was not sufficient to generate enough 
jobs for South Africa's burgeoning labor pool, the result
38Switzerland, a noted world creditor, to date has declined to 
impose any such sanctions against South Africa.
39Foreian Economic Trends, 7.
Estimates by South African Reserve Bank for net capital outflows 
during:
1985- R9.2 billion
1986- R6.1 billion
1987- R3.1 billion
1988- R6.4 billion
40Foreian Economic Trends, South Africa. 2.
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being a steadily increasing unemployment rate.41 It should be 
noted that the population sector most hurt by this increase 
in unemployment is the black sector, which is characterized 
as mostly unskilled and low paid labor. The black labor 
sector has been estimated to be enduring at least a 2 3% 
unemployment rate.42
Other problems for the economy as a result of financial 
sanctions has been an increasing inflation rate. In 1984, 
inflation was estimated at 11.7%. By February, 1988, 
inflation had increased to an estimated 15%-16%. Although 
very high, this is a marked improvement over 1986, when 
inflation was running at 19.6%, due in part to the already 
mentioned actions of foreign banks which precipitated a large 
outflow of currency.
The above statistics reveal the importance of foreign 
investment and capital for the South African economy. To 
maintain the high rate of growth necessary to its burgeoning 
work force, the South African economy has needed a large 
inflow of capital. Before sanctions by the U.S. and other 
industrialized states, capital was forthcoming from private
41 Brenda M. Branaman, South Africa: Recent Developments
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs
and National Defense Division, July 13, 1989), 9, IB85213.
It is estimated that the South African economy would have to 
grow by at least 5% a year to satisfy the increasing supply of 
labor.
42Ibid.
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firms, banks, and governments. with the bans on bank loans 
and new foreign investment implemented in 1985-1986, the 
importance of earning capital through exports assumed greater 
importance for the South African economy. This revealed the 
importance of trade sanctions, especially import sanctions. 
The real and potential net capital outflow from the economy, 
already reduced by financial sanctions, might presumably be 
increased by reducing the number of markets for South Africa's 
goods and depriving it of needed imports. Khan points out 
that South Africa's top six trading partners, the U.S., U.K., 
France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan, have the potential to 
determine trade sanctions' effectiveness in accomplishing the 
intermediate objective of seriously harming the South African 
economy.43
Import sanctions on goods exported by the South African 
economy would be most effective in depriving South Africa of 
needed capital. U.S. sanctions, and to a lesser extent EEC 
and Japanese sanctions, were fashioned to realize this goal. 
Included in the U.S. sanctions policy, for example, were bans
43Haider Ali Khan, The Political Economy of Sanctions Against 
Apartheid. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 53-4.
Imports from top six trading partners—  percentage of overall 
imports
1982- 84.2% 1983- 82.8% 1984- 80.8% 1985- 80.4%
1986- 80.9% Jan./June 1987- 81.8%
Exports to top six trading partners— percentage of overall exports 
1982- 84.0% 1983- 83.8% 1984- 83.4% 1985- 83.2%
1986- 81.9% Jan./June 1987- 81.0%
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on the importation of coal, iron, steel, uranium, textiles, 
and agricultural products. Despite these import sanctions, 
the South African economy has continued to enjoy a positive 
trade balance, but its current account balance (CAB), although 
still positive, has decreased steadily. By 1989, South 
Africa's CAB was estimated at $1.6 billion, down from $3.0 
billion in 1987.44
Exports to South Africa were also aimed at significantly 
impeding its rate of economic growth. The most important 
export banned was oil. As an industrialized state with a well 
developed infrastructure, South Africa's need for oil is 
obvious. With no natural oil reserves, the country has been 
traditionally quite dependent upon oil imports. Although oil 
only accounts for 20% of South Africa's total energy 
consumption, it accounts for about 1/3 of South Africa's total 
import expenditures.45 The importance of oil is further 
increased because of the highly mechanized military and 
security institutions involved in the enforcement of
44Foreian Economic Trends, 2.
In 1987, South African exports amounted to $21.0 billion while 
its imports were valued at 13.8 billion. In 1988, exports were 
valued at $20.9 billion, imports being valued at $16.4 billion. 
The projected value of exports and imports for 1989 were estimated 
at $21.2 billion and $15.2 billion.
U.S. exports to and imports from South Africa in 1987 amounted 
to $1.3 billion and $1.4 billion, respectively. In 1988, these 
figures were estimated at $1.7 billion and $1.6 billion.
45Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, Oiling the Wheels of Apartheid, 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 17.
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apartheid. Although most of the sanctioning states, including 
the U.S., imposed bans on the exports of oil, South Africa has 
been able to circumvent these sanctions in its quest for oil, 
as will be discussed in the following section. Because of 
such "special procedures", however, South Africa has been 
forced to pay an extremely high price for the oil it imports, 
in turn increasing capital outflow, and depriving the economy 
of currency needed for growth.
The other significant export ban involved high technology 
goods, including computers and electronics. As a developed 
state with sophisticated production processes, South Africa 
is critically dependent on advanced technological goods which 
can only be imported from similarly advanced states. Although 
imposed by most of the above states, the U.S., West European 
states, and Japan, such sanctions were aimed only at the South 
African government and security agencies. Foreign goods of 
the high-technology variety, especially those produced in the 
U.S. and Japan, continue to flow into South Africa's private 
sector.
Sanctions imposed against South Africa by the United 
States and other states have had a deleterious effect upon the 
former state's economy, but has this economic damage itself 
increased the likelihood that the South African government 
will acquiesce to the demands of the world community and 
abolish apartheid as well as establish a non-racial democracy? 
Has the intermediate objective of U.S. sanctions, substantial
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damage to the South African economy, been actualized? The 
answer is no. To date, economic sanctions imposed by the 
U.S., as well as others, have not inflicted such substantial 
damage upon the South African economy. It would be hard to 
argue that, on their own, the economic impact of such measures 
has been adequate to force the termination of apartheid, much 
less the establishment of a true non-racial democracy, in 
South Africa. Similarly, it would be hard to argue that the 
impact of such sanctions upon its economy is the principal 
cause of the domestic reforms recently implemented by the 
South African government.
Causes for Limited Success of U.S. Sanctions
The following section will attempt to discover those 
factors which may have limited the ability of U.S. sanctions 
policy against South Africa to realize the intermediate goal 
of causing sufficiently severe economic damage to South 
Africa. This, according to the theory of sanctions, should 
limit the likelihood that the sanctions' ultimate objectives, 
the termination of apartheid and the establishment of non- 
racial democracy in South Africa, will be achieved via such 
economic coercion. Furthermore, if these events do transpire 
in South Africa, it would be hard to argue that the economic 
impact of sanctions was the principal causes for them. 
Recalling the hypothesis presented at the beginning of this 
study, that the ability of an economic sanctions policy to 
achieve the necessary intermediate goal of inflicting 
substantial damage upon a target state's economy will be 
limited if the sanctions themselves are poorly enforced, 
poorly calibrated in terms of the target's economy,^or if the 
target's economy is sufficiently developed and diversified to 
render it invulnerable to the deleterious effects of the 
policyTlan analysis of the U.S. sanctions policy will yield 
an explanation for its limited success in realizing this 
intermediate goal to date. Furthermore, the following
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analysis will reveal a discrepency in current sanctions
critical, [the South African government has recently undertaken
reforms suggestive of its intent to abolish the apartheid 
system. Current theory fails to account for possible 
non-economic effects of sanctions upon a target state which 
may be as influential and decisive as sanctions' economic 
impact.
U.S. sanctions towards South Africa were formulated to 
affect key sectors of the South African economy? they were 
well calibrated. Bans on the importation of krugerrands and 
later all other gold products, uranium, coal, iron, steel, 
agricultural products and textiles, were aimed at some of the 
most important sectors of South Africa's export economy. 
Daoudi and Dajani, as well as Galtung, recognize the utility 
of imposing import sanctions on states which are trade 
dependent, especially on specific goods. With the exception
of agricultural products and textiles, he goods banned
represent products of the South African mining industry, an 
important sector in its export economy. The mining industry
figures indicate that, excluding krugerrands, the value of 
these exports in aggregate amounted to $4.3 billion, 26% of
theory. Although the damage done to its economy has not been
accounts for about 12% of South Africa's GDF In 1985, 81.6% 
of South Africa's total mining output was exported.46 Seaga's
46Becker, 65.
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total merchandise exports in 1985.47 Another important 
sanction, already discussed, was the ban by the U.S. and the 
EEC on exports of oil to South Africa. Lastly, and most 
importantly, U.S. sanctions prohibiting new investment and 
bank loans were extremely effectual in denying South Africa 
important sources of capital it had traditionally been 
dependent on to maintain its high rate of growth7|
U.S. sanctions, it would seem, were well calibrated in 
terms of affecting important sectors of the South African 
economy. However, as Renwick points out, even sanctions well 
calibrated will necessitate complex administrative structures 
for their enforcement.48 In this regard, U.S. sanctions were 
faced with numerous difficulties. Comprehensive as they were, 
numerous loopholes effectively undermined the ultimate utility 
of the sanctions policy.
Although the CAAA explicitly banned importation of South 
African steel to the U.S., imports of which amounted to about 
$301 million in 1986, steel continued to be imported to the 
U.S. In 1987-88, an estimated $353.6 million worth of steel 
was imported from South Africa to the United States. One 
particular instance is the Houston Ship Channel bridge, a $91 
million project being built with steel girders produced in 
South Africa. Although raw steel is banned under the CAAA,
47Seaga, 13 9.
48Renwick, 78.
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steel girders are classified as "fabricated products" which
have undergone "substantial transformation," and such goods
are not prohibited from importation to the U.S. under the
CAAA.49 The Commerce Department has estimated that since the
implementation of the CAAA in 1986, more than 900,000 tons of
South African iron and steel in the form of "fabricated
products", worth at least $350 million, has entered the United
States in such a legal manner.50 Another loophole proved to
be sanctions against South African state-owned enterprises,
known as parastatals. A GAO report published July 12, 1989,
three years after passage of the CAAA, reported that the U.S.
Department of State had not yet supplied the U.S. Customs
service with a list of products produced by South African
parastatals.
Customs requires importers to certify that all 
goods imported into the United States from 
South Africa are not produced, marketed, or 
exported by a parastatal. ...However, Customs 
does not know which products are associated with 
parastatals and so cannot give special attention 
to imports produced by industries in which 
parastatals are active.51
49J. Michael Kennedy, "Republic of South Africa Skirts 
Sanctions," L.A. Times. 16 November 1989, A22.
50Robert Pear, "Despite Sanctions, Steel From Pretoria Is 
Entering the U.S.," New York Times. April 15, 1990, 1(A) and 1(K).
5 Government Accounting Office, South Africa: Enhancing
Enforcement of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (Washington, 
D.C.: General Accounting Office, National Security and
International Affairs Division, July 12, 1989), 2.
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In effect, although goods produced by the 106 South African 
parastatals were banned, the Customs Service had never 
received a list of the specific goods identified with 
parastatals, and therefore could not effectively enforce that 
particular set of sanctions. Therefore, the GAO concluded 
that:
Customs has inadequate tools to enforce the ban 
on imports from South African parastatals. 
Amending State's list of parastatal entities to 
include the products associated with each parastatal 
would enhance Customs ability to enforce the ban and 
imrove the information available to importers when 
certifying that imports do no come from a 
parastatal.52
Legislation in the 101st Congress sought in some measure 
to close such loopholes, as well as others, by strengthening 
U.S. sanctions law under the CAAA. H.R. 21 and S.507, bills 
which would have made U.S. sanctions much more stringent by 
banning all U.S. investment in South Africa and expanding the 
range of trade sanctions, were referred to various committees 
in early 1989.53 Although both bills advocated increasing the 
scope of sanctions as a means to increase their potential 
effectiveness, neither addressed the issue of sanctions' 
enforcement, an issue which necessarily undermined their 
effectiveness.
52Ibid. , 4.
53CRS Issue Brief, "South Africa: U.S. Policy After
Sanctions." Brenda M. Branaman, CRS11-2.
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Although U.S. sanctions' effectiveness were in some 
measure limited by the problem of their enforcement, 
ultimately, j^ke nature * of South Africa's economy—  well- 
developed, diversified, engaged in trade with numerous 
countries other than the United States- has been the principal 
factor limiting the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions polic^T/l
e— \ — '
I Excepting the U.S., South Africa's principal trading partners 
are industrialized states which, although having imposed their 
own set of economic sanctions, continue to engage in high 
volume of trade with South Africa. \.The sanctions imposed by 
these states, the U.K., France, West Germany, Italy, and 
Japan, were much less comprehensive than those of the U.sTj 
In spite of sanctions, the European Community remains 
economically close to South Africa. ^The EEC and individual 
European countries failed to ban imports of South African 
agricultural products, textiles, raw gold (gold coins were 
banned), and coal Van der Stoel notes that although iron 
and steel imports were banned, these particular sanctions were 
hollow because steel alloys, a principal European import from 
South Africa within the metals sanctions category were 
excluded.54 In June, 1986 EEC government heads met to discuss 
a possible ban on the importation of South African coal. This 
proposal would have had dire consequences for the South
54Max van der Stoel, "Breaking the Laager: A Two-Track Western 
Policy Toward South Africa," in Europe. America, and South Africa, 
ed. Gregory F. Treverton (New York: NYU Press, 1988), 64.
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African economy, in that its coal exports to Europe amounted 
to about $1.2 billion annually. However, opposition to the 
proposal by West Germany and Portugal effectively scrapped 
this potentially decisive trade ban, in turn diminishing the 
general effects of sanctions by protecting a major source of 
South Africa's export income.55
South African exports to EEC states, including the 
aforementioned European states, steadily rose during the 
1980s. In 1982, such exports were valued at $3.82 billion; 
by 1988, they were valued at $6.72 billion.56 Clearly, these 
figures indicate a vigorous trade earning South Africa 
substantial, not to mention necessary, earnings.
Financial sanctions imposed by European states against 
South Africa were more limited than those of the U.S. Whereas 
the U.S., under the CAAA, placed bans on new investment in 
South Africa as well bank loans to the South African 
government, the EEC in particular, and most European states 
in general, imposed much looser financial sanctions. Although 
the EEC, members, including the U.K., France, West Germany, 
and Italy, placed a ban on bank loans, they were limited to 
long term loans.57 The U.K. never adopted the EEC ban on new 
investment in South Africa, instead imposing a voluntary ban.
55Van der Stoel, 64.
56Pirection of Trade Statistics, IMF Yearbook, 1989, "South
Africa," 357.
57Seaga, 137.
partner by 1987.59
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In February, 1990, the British government announced that this 
voluntary ban on investment in South Africa would be lifted, 
further undermining the general effectiveness of economic 
sanctions imposed by the U.S. and others.58
Although officially opposed to apartheid, and having 
implemented economic and financial sanctions in 1986,(Japan 
had replaced the U.S. as South Africa's leading trading
In 198 6, Japan's trade with South Africa 
was valued at $3.6 billion; this figure rose to $4.1 billion 
by 1987. South African exports to Japan earned it $2.2 
billion in 1987 declining to $1.7 billion in 1988.60 As U.S. 
firms withdrew from South Africa in the late 1980s, Japanese 
firms often took their place. For example, following the 
withdrawals of General Motors in December of 1986 and Ford 
Motor in April, 1988, Japan's share of the South African auto 
market increased by 62% within one year.61 Although the 
Japanese government imposed a ban on all investment in South
58Kleran Cooke and David Buchan, Financial Times. "U.K. angers 
EC partners with decision on sanctions," 21 February 1990, 1.
59"Bucking Sanctions," Johannesburg Financial Mail. 21 July 
1989, 36.
In 1988, West Germany surpassed Japan as South Africa's principal 
trading partner, with an estimated $4.9 billion in trade. Further 
in 1988, Japanese trade with South Africa decreased by 7.0%, to 
$3.82 billion.
60Pirection of Trade Statistics, 3 56.
61 John D. Battersby, "South African Trade Now Led by Japan," 
New York Times, 7 September 1987, L25.
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Africa, by far the most stringent financial sanction imposed 
by any state including the U.S., it allowed Japanese firms to 
produce and market products, including vehicles and computers, 
under licensing agreements with South African firms.62
In spite of the sanctions imposed against it, with the 
exception of Japan, in 1988, South Africa recorded double­
digit increases in trade with all its top ten trading 
partners. With the exception of Switzerland, all of these 
states have imposed some economic sanctions against South 
Africa.63 Clearly, as these states increase trade with South 
Africa, the efficacy of their sanctions against the latter 
decrease.
As the number of its trading partners helped reduce its 
vulnerability to economic sanctions, so too did the character 
of South African exports reduce this vulnerability. Treverton 
notes that South Africa's principal exports are low-bulk, non­
manufactured items, such as gold, diamonds, minerals, and 
agricultural products. Gold and diamond exports in
particular, which comprise over one half of South Africa's 
export earnings, are items which are especially hard to trace 
because of the above characteristics.64 Because such items
62Khan, 33.
63"Bucking Sanctions".
64Gregory F. Treverton, "Framing the Issues," in Europe_«_ 
America, and South Africa ed. Gregory F. Treverton (New York: NYU
Press, 1988) , 9.
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axe not manufactured goods and cannot be traced, it is very 
easy for them to be transshipped through third countries into 
sanctioning countries. The GAO estimated that 91% of Italian 
gold jewelry currently sold in the U.S. was made with South 
African gold.65 Khan notes that South Africa, in response to 
various states1 bans on the importation of gold, increased 
exports of non-banned items, such as minerals, sugar, 
textiles, and agricultural products.66
South Africa has also attempted, with some degree of 
success, to circumvent various sanctions by mis-labeling its 
export goods. As the leading member of SACU, the Southern
African Customs Union, whose members include South Africa,
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia, South Africa has 
steadily exported its goods to these states, who in turn 
export them to states imposing various economic sanctions.67
These techniques to circumvent trade sanctions, sanctions 
busting as it were, imposed by the U.S. and others have also 
been applied by South Africa to its imports of oil. The
importance of oil to the South African economy is manifest in
the broad range of actions taken to preserve this vital source 
of energy. Since 1964, South Africa has maintained a 
strategic stockpile of oil. Klinghoffer notes that at its
65Kennedy, Al.
66 Khan, 53.
67Charles M. Becker, "Economic Sanctions Against South Africa,” 
World Politics. 39 (January 1987): 151.
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current rate of consumption, South Africa's strategic 
stockpile of oil would last two years. However, if oil 
sanctions became more comprehensive, if more states imposed 
them, for example, rationing could extend this figure to up 
to twelve years. South Africa has also attempted to decrease 
its dependence on foreign oil through the development of a 
synthetic oil-from-coal process developed by the state South 
African Oil and Gas Corporation, SASOL. Although the process 
is not yet cost-effective, the price per barrel being 
estimated at $75, in the event of a total oil embargo, South 
Africa could presumably expand this operation after buying 
time with its strategic petroleum reserve, to the point of
• • 69 • • •becoming self-sufficient m  energy. Considering that oil 
accounts for only one-fifth of its total energy consumption, 
admittedly an important one-fifth, South African self- 
sufficiency in energy, if events dictate, is a possibility.
South Africa has not yet faced the above problem for the 
reason that it still enjoys^many sources of oil. Although 
U.S. oil companies such as Mobil and Caltex are active in the 
South African energy industry, actual shipments of U.S. oil 
to South Africa comprised such a minor role in overall South 
African oil imports as to render this particular embargo 
rather ineffective. This in particular illustrates the
^Klinghoffer, 26.
69Ibid.
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necessity for multilateral sanctions. Although the U.S. role 
in the oil trade with South Africa was small, oil embargoes 
by its European allies as well as by important oil producing 
states elsewhere could have had an important effect upon the 
South African economy, increasing the possibility for such 
sanctions success. Such embargoes, however, were never fully 
implemented. For example, although Norway was one of the 
first European states to enact comprehensive sanctions against 
South Africa in 1985, oil exports were excluded because the 
destinations of Norwegian oil tankers are decided at sea. In 
effect, Norwegian oil was, and is free to flow to South 
Africa.70 Klinghoffer notes that the oil embargoes to South 
Africa imposed by European states in 1985 "have served as 
constraints rather than barriers- the oil continues to flow."71
In spite of embargoes "officially" imposed against South 
Africa by members of the Arab community, Arab oil has also 
managed to find its way into South Africa during the 1980s. 
Most notably, it is estimated that Saudi Arabia, between 1979- 
1985, made 112 deliveries to South Africa amounting to 22 
million tons, or one-quarter of South Africa's oil imports 
during this time.72 Other Arab states, Oman, Kuwait, Libya, 
and the United Arab Emirates have supplied, and presumably
70Khan, 32.
71Klinghoffer, 8.
72Ibid. , 42.
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continue to supply, oil to South Africa.
In effect, the potentially decisive multilateral oil 
embargo against South Africa has only served to inconvenience 
that state by raising oil prices. Doxey observes that "Oil 
sanctions may raise fuel prices and make South Africa more 
susceptible to fraud, but they are really a mild form of 
punishment rather than a lever effecting the 
deinstitutionalization of apartheid.1173 Indeed, this statement 
rings true for overall economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. 
and other states against South Africa. Its numerous trading 
partners and its diversified economy earn it capital through 
many different sectors such as mining, agriculture, 
manufacturing. This, and its ability to skirt sanctions 
through the various aforementioned strategies (which are but 
a few), have rendered the South African economy seemingly 
impervious to the current economic sanctions imposed against 
it.
^Margaret Doxey, "Oil and Food as International Sanctions," 
International Journal. 36 (Spring 1981): 325.
Conclusions
The principal factor explaining the limited success of 
U.S. economic sanctions is the relative invulnerability of the 
South African economy to such a policy. Although U.S. 
sanctions were well calibrated in regards to important sectors 
of the target economy, South Africa, with a diversified, 
modern economy and trade relations with numerous states, 
including several which have imposed economic sanctions 
against it, has managed to insulate itself to date from the 
severe economic effects a sanctions policy must realize if it 
is to coerce a target government to engage in sought after 
domestic reforms. To a lesser extent, the limited success of 
sanctions in inflicting substantial harm upon the South 
African economy is due to the problem of enforcement. Even 
U.S. economic sanctions, arguably the most stringent of any 
set of sanctions imposed against South Africa, are serioiusly 
undermined by numerous loopholes which permit substantial 
trade between the the two countries. For these reasons 
mentioned, economic sanctions have not been sufficiently 
damaging to its economy to coerce the South African government 
to terminate its apartheid system. The issue could be raised 
that the success of sanctions is a matter of time. It could 
be convincingly argued that the effectiveness of sanctions
55
56
will be manifest if sufficient time is given to allow enough 
harm to be done to the South African economy. However, this 
argument is still based on the premise that for economic 
sanctions to successfully damage a target's economy, they must 
be sufficiently proximate to the target's economy, vigorously 
enforced by the sender states, and enacted by the target's key 
trading partners. Given these qualifications, the prospect 
that sanctions, as currently imposed by various states 
including the U.S., will have a sufficient economic impact to 
coerce South Africa to acquiesce to the international 
community and end apartheid would seem negligible.
Although economic sanctions have yet to fully realize 
both the intermediate goal of inflicting substantial economic 
harm on South Africa and the ultimate, explicit goal of the 
termination of apartheid, this policy has realized some very 
important implicit goals for the U.S. As for the implicit 
goal of showing U.S. opposition to apartheid, the policy has 
known a measure of success. Indeed, U.S. sanctions against 
apartheid, being much more comprehensive than those initiated 
by other states, reveal official U.S. resolve to see the 
termination of apartheid. Of course, one must qualify such 
official resolve with the fact that the U.S. government still 
permits significant economic trade with South Africa. U.S. 
sanctions have also helped maintain America's purported image 
in the international community as a state committed to racial 
equality. Additionally, as Carter points out, U.S. sanctions
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against South Africa have educated the American populace about 
apartheid, thereby raising collective consciousness, in and 
of itself a worthy goal1.74 Lastly, U.S. economic sanctions 
have fulfilled the implicit goal mentioned by Galtung and 
Klinghoffer of symbolically punishing South Africa for its 
racist policy.
74Carter, 23.
Rethinking The Theory of Sanctions
Although the South African government maintains in a de 
jure as well as a de facto manner its system of racial 
segregation and oppression known as apartheid, it has recently 
engaged in domestic reforms suggesting its intent to abolish 
the apartheid system in the future. Such reforms include the 
unbanning of the African National Congress and the release of 
black nationalist Nelson Mandela in early 1990. The above 
findings, which indicate that current economic sanctions have 
had limited success in inflicting substantial damage on the 
South African economy, suggest that the impetus for this 
liberalization derived from a source (or sources) other than 
sanctions' economic duress. Possibly, the South African 
government's liberalizing decisions are the result of 
pressures from both the white and black communities in South 
Africa for domestic reform. Strikes, riots, and conflicts 
with South African security forces have characterized the 
South Africn domestic scene throughout the 1980s. The popular 
desire to end South Africa's years of isolation and its 
characterization as a pariah state in the international 
community quite probably are the principal causes of such 
domestic pressure. In this regard, the sanctions imposed 
against South Africa can be argued to have been effective
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insofar as they were an important cause for this 
characterization of South Africa and subsequent popular 
discontent with the apartheid system.
As of this writing, historic meetings between formerlly 
banned groups such as the ANC and the South African Communist 
Party with the South African government are being held. One 
may question the extent to which economic sanctions have 
contributed to such pressure. Certainly, economic sanctions 
have added to the pressure for reform and change; however, the 
above analysis regarding sanctions' limited success in 
realizing even their intermediate goal clearly indicates that 
the economic impact of these sanctions has not been the 
principal cause of such pressure.
The purpose of this study, it must be recalled, was not 
to discover the source of political change, or lack thereof, 
in South Africa, but to determine the degree of success 
current sanctions by the U.S. and others, have had in 
inflicting substantial harm to the South African economy. 
Because this necessary intermediate objective has not yet been 
realized, it is quite hard to argue that the economic impact 
of these sanctions has or will compel the South African 
government to engage in substantive political reforms 
vis-a-vis the termination of apartheid and the establishment 
of a non-racial democracy in that state.
On a broader level, this study has revealed those 
conditions which will limit the efficacy of an economic
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sanctions policy in realizing the necessary intermediate goal 
of causing substantial damage to a target state's economy. 
If economic sanctions are not well calibrated in terms of 
important sectors of the target state's economy, if such 
sanctions are poorly enforced, or if the target state's 
economy is sufficiently developed in terms of diverstiy and 
trading partners to render it invulnerable to such sanctions, 
then sanctions' ability to realize the intermediate goal of 
causing substantial economic damage will be severly limited. 
However, the exceptional case of U.S. and multilateral 
sanctions against South Africa suggests that the effectiveness 
of such a policy does not rest solely upon its ability to 
inflict economic damage; economic sanctions may be able to 
induce change in a target state without realizing the 
intermediate goal of inflicting substantial economic on the 
latter's economy.
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